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The Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties: An
Examination of Current Industry Standards and
Practices*
The Federal Trade Commission has recently published a comprehensive
report addressing a wide variety of issues concerning the real estate indus-
try. The authors herein address several prominent issues within the report
while examining current legal treatment of the fiduciary duties imposed
on real estate brokers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The significance of purchasing a home has assumed many dif-
ferent meanings for consumers in today's real estate market. For
some, the transaction signifies the decision to "take roots." For
others, the transaction is a necessary financial investment. For
still others, purchasing real estate is an income-producing activ-
ity. Whatever the motivation, parties to a real estate transaction
invest a great deal of time, money and personal energy when they
become involved in the purchase of property.
For these reasons, both purchasers and sellers of real estate are
reasonably entitled to rely on adequate representation of their
best interests during all phases of a real estate transaction. How-
ever, it is an unfortunate reality of the law that parties to a real
estate transaction, particularly purchasers, are often not ade-
quately represented.' Furthermore, most parties are unaware of
this lack of representation. Consumer knowledge of the role a
real estate broker 2 plays in residential real estate transactions is
* This article is the product of a collaboration between two students. The
opinions and conclusions in the article do not necessarily reflect the views of both
authors.
1. After receiving numerous complaints from consumers, consumer groups,
and real estate agents about unfair practices in the industry and inadequate repre-
sentation of parties' interests, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) undertook a
staff investigation in order to inquire into the role of the broker in residential bro-
kerage transactions, including the conflicting duties and interests which make it
difficult to adequately represent consumers. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF
REPORT, RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY (Gov't Print, December
1983) (Stock #018-000-00305-8) [hereinafter cited as FTC REPORT]. The FTC com-
missioned National Family Opinion, Inc. (NFO) to survey a nationwide cross-sec-
tion of recent sellers and buyers of residential real estate.
2. The terms "broker" and "agent" are used interchangeably throughout the
alarmingly low. 3
The source of confusion most likely stems from the disparity
between the apparent relationship the seller, broker and pur-
chaser share and the actual legal relationship which is created by
both agency and real estate law. Determining the legal relation-
ships between broker, seller, and buyer is an urgent issue in the
real estate field today which demands resolution.4
An overview of the application of agency and real estate law
will be presented, along with various legal theories which have
become somewhat popularized. Next, the authors will present al-
ternative solutions to the current legal treatment of the bro-
ker/client relationship.
II. OVERVIEW
A. The Significance of Broker/Consumer Relationships
The utility and necessity of the functions performed by residen-
tial real estate brokers are well recognized today.5 The average
consumer is often inexperienced and ill-equipped to handle the
contractual and financial procedures required to consummate an
orderly and safe transfer of real estate.6 Coupled with the fact
that the buying and selling of residential real estate normally con-
stitutes the largest financial transaction in the average con-
sumer's lifetime, the use of competent brokerage services is
required as a primary way to hedge against the personal financial
risks involved.
text to denote the agent involved in real estate transactions. Licensed brokers
have been described as "principals, partners, corporate officers or trustees, [who]
are engaged principally in buying, selling, exchanging, renting or leasing, manag-
ing, appraising or financing [rjeal [e]state for others for compensation ......
Grillo v. Board of Realtors, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 207, 219 A.2d 635, 637 (1966) (citation
omitted).
3. Grillo, 91 N.J. Super. at 209-18, 219 A.2d at 643-52. See also Currier, Finding
The Broker's Place In The Typical Residential Real Estate Transaction, 33 U. FLA.
L. REV. 655 (1981).
4. Rein, Whose Broker Is I4 Anyway?, LA. MAG. Feb. 1984, at 186, 187. The
California Department of Real Estate (DRE) has created a task force to specifi-
cally analyze the obvious conflicts of interest within the system. Additionally, the
DRE has commissioned two studies on agency and dual agency relationships. Cal-
ifornia Technical Assistance Associates, Inc. (CTAA), DUAL AGENCY PROBLEMS IN
CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS (1981); CTAA, THE EXTENT AND NATURE
OF SINGLE AGENCY REAL ESTATE PRACTICES IN CALIFORNIA (1981).
5. Approximately 81% of all sellers of single-family residences engage the
services of brokers. FITC REPORT, supra note 1, Consumer Survey, Figure I-1, at 8.
More than 1% of the entire population of the United States holds a brokerage li-
cense. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 63.
6. The broker performs such services as price estimating, submitting the list-
ing to the Multiple Listing Service (MLS), negotiating sales terms, arranging es-
crow, and arranging for financing.
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The market-making and advisory functions performed by bro-
kers have contributed to broad consumer reliance upon brokerage
services. The experienced broker can be invaluable in providing
accurate and complete information on market conditions and
matching compatible sellers with prospective purchasers. 7 The
parties to a transaction rely on a broad range of brokerage serv-
ices including suggestions of financing alternatives and the advice
and assistance offered in negotiating the terms of the sale.8 Such
dependence points to the significance of the broker/consumer re-
lationship and the necessity for consumers and their advising at-
torneys to gain familiarity and understanding of the legal
obligations and duties real estate brokers owe to both buyers and
sellers.
B. The Initiation of the Property Transfer
1. Formation of the Listing Contract
The broker/client relationship arises most frequently through a
written agreement. 9 There are three common types of written
7. Multiple Listing Services (MLS) are organizations composed of brokers in
local geographic areas that disseminate information on listings procured by each
participating MLS broker to all other MLS brokers. The key to needing brokers
for these purposes revolves around the lack of consumer access to MLS. See FTC
REPORT, supra note 1, at 210-19 (membership requirements of MLS). Approxi-
mately 92% of the sellers surveyed felt the agent's knowledge of the housing mar-
ket was an important factor when they selected a real estate agent. FTC REPORT,
supra note 1, at National Family Opinion, Inc. Survey (NFO Survey) seller ques-
tion 52. An agent's honesty or integrity and ability as a salesperson were slightly
more important to the sellers surveyed. Id.
8. For survey data on the broker's functions and the relative amount of time
spent in each function, see Barry & Finley, FrC REPORT, supra note 1, at 51 n.3
(chart). See also id. at 49-56 (buyers' and sellers' demand for brokerage services).
9. This agreement need not go far beyond affirming the existence of the rela-
tionship itself. See C. Forsman Real Estate Co. v. Hatch, 97 Idaho 511, 547 P.2d
1116 (1976) (the listing contract had to describe the property only well enough to
ensure that the seller and broker understood which property was to be sold and
that the broker be able to locate it for purposes of showing to buyers). But cf. Ar-
ruda Realty, Inc. v. Doyon, 35 Conn. Supp. 617, 401 A.2d 625 (1978) (listing agree-
ment held unenforceable for failure to include the seller's address as required by
state statute).
The California Department of Real Estate requires that all exclusive listings to
sell must have a termination date due to the lack of informed consent given by the
seller. Failure to do so will invalidate the contract and may even result in discipli-
nary actions against the broker. Rhoads, Exclusive Listings Are Unfair Contracts,
9 REAL EST. REV. 93 (Summer 1979).
Sometimes the amount of the broker's commission must be stated. See Gray v.
Kohlase, 18 Ariz. App. 368, 502 P.2d 169 (1972) (memorandum sufficient to show
employment had omitted the amount of commission and thus, broker was unable
listing contracts.1 0 The open (or non-exclusive) listing provides
the seller with the most flexibility. More than one broker may be
hired under such a contract. A broker will earn a commission
only if he (and not the seller) is the first to procure a purchaser."
An exclusive agency listing bars the owner from hiring another
broker to sell; however, the property owner himself may sell his
house without compensation to the broker.12 This listing may
to recover as the amount of commission was an essential element of the contract).
The broker/seller relationship may even arise by implication. See Sharp-Boyl-
ston Co. v. Lundeen, 145 Ga. App. 672, 244 S.E.2d 622 (1978) (broker-procured in-
formation used by seller which ultimately culminated in a sale. The seller had
accepted valuable services and broker was entitled to recover in quantum meruit
on seller's implied promise to pay); Kohn v. Cohn, 567 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978) (stating that before a broker may expect compensation an employment con-
tract must exist, either express or implied).
This is often seen where a written listing agreement has expired, and then is im-
pliedly extended. See Danieli Corp. v. Bryant, 399 So. 2d 387 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (vendor waived the initial listing contract terms by telling brokers to con-
tinue work after contract had expired); Ferris v. Meeker Fertilizer Co., 258 Or. 377,
482 P.2d 523 (1971) (seller impliedly waived the written agreement's provision on
time for performance by approving and encouraging the broker to continue efforts
to close the sale).
However, many jurisdictions require a writing simply in order to satisfy the stat-
ute of frauds requirements governing contracts for the sale of real estate. See, e.g.,
Good v. Paine Furniture Co., 35 Conn. Supp. 24, 391 A.2d 741 (1978) (documents
offered by broker in court must singly or in aggregrate satisfy the statute of
frauds); Jones v. Del Anderson and Assocs., 539 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1976); CAL. Crv.
CODE § 1624(5) (West Supp. 1984). See also Annot., 9 A.L.R. 2d 747 (1950).
A minority of jurisdictions view listing agreements as contracts for the perform-
ance of personal services and therefore exempt from the statute. See, e.g., Seay v.
Bennett and Kahnweiler Assocs., 73 Ill. App. 3d 944, 392 N.E.2d 609 (1979) (broker
allowed to recover in quantum meruit if shown that services were rendered);
Reich v. Kimnach, 216 Va. 109, 216 S.E.2d 58 (1975) (oral listing agreement was en-
forceable where required to be performed within one year and was a contract for
services). Cf. Nepa v. Marta, 348 A.2d 182 (Del. 1975) (court held the statute of
frauds inapplicable as the terms of the listing agreement could be performed
within one year); Samuels v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 342 So. 2d 661, 662
(La. 1977) (citing Whatley v. McMillan, 152 La. 978, 94 So. 905 (1922), which held
that listing agreements need not be in writing as they in no way affect the real es-
tate, unlike the placing of encumbrances on real estate).
10. See generally CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, Real Estate
Broker Practice §§ 1.59-1.63 (June-July 1981).
11. Kelly v. Beaudoin, 131 Vt. 27, 298 A.2d 831 (1972) (broker implicitly accepts
competition with the seller when entering into a non-exclusive listing contract).
12. Des Rivieres v. Sullivan, 247 Mass. 443, 142 N.E. 111 (1924) (bro-
ker/exclusive agent unable to recover where owner sold the property before agent
had opportunity to proffer other ready, willing and able purchaser); Martin Realty
Co. v. Fletcher, 103 N.J.L. 294, 136 A. 498 (1927) (plaintiff was unable to recover
commission where owner sold the property, even though authorized "exclusively"
to sell the property, construed as an exclusive agency); Annot., 88 A.L.R. 2d 936
(1950). The mere fact that the listing contract refers to the broker as an exclusive
agent is enough to create an exclusive agency. Harris & White v. Stone, 137 Ark.
23, 207 S.W. 443 (1918) (owner allowed to sell the property himself as long as he
dealt with his "exclusive agent" in good faith).
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also allow the seller access to a multiple listing service (MLS).'3
The exclusive right to sell listing entitles the broker to a commis-
sion regardless of who ultimately sells the property, provided that
the sale is consummated within a specified period of time.14 Ex-
clusive listings authorize the broker to cooperate with subagents
and are interpreted by brokers as an authorization to use the
MLS.'5 This is by far the most prevalent type of listing contract.16
2. Contractual Standardization
Problematic of the widespread use of exclusive right to sell list-
ings is the standardization of contracts. The more obvious factors
contributing to the standardization of formal broker/seller rela-
tionships through exclusive listings are the sellers' inexperience
in the purchase of brokerage services and the brokers' desire to
obtain the right to a commission. Indeed, the whole Realtor sys-
tem appears to be geared toward bringing the pressures of uni-
formity to bear in such a way as to ensure that the broker has the
most favored position under the contract. The courts have long
recognized this lack of contractual flexibility confronting sellers.' 7
Local Realtor boards often dictate such important terms as the
type of listing available, the time frame for MLS use, the intended
degree of cooperation with other brokers, the duration of the list-
ing contract, and the standard contract forms to be used.' 8 Re-
13. See supra note 7. A minority of MLS's accept exclusive agency listings.
F C REPORT, supra note 1, at 131.
14. Flynn v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 9 Ill. 2d 129, 137 N.E.2d 71 (1956) (dictum)
(broker may be able to recover where owner effects the sale of property subject to
exclusive right to sell). See Annot., 88 A.L.R. 2d 941 (1950); E. FIcEK, T. HENDER-
SON & R. JOHNSON, REAL ESTATE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 255-57 (1976).
15. FrC REPORT, supra note 1, at 3177. MLS's cannot reject exclusive listings
submitted by NAR members on the basis of the quality or price. NAT'L ASS'N OF
REALTORS, MULTIPLE LISTING PoLicY 6-2 (4th ed. 1980).
16. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 3177.
17. Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 555, 236 A.2d 843, 857 (1967)
(the use of standardized forms, which laypersons are compelled to enter into even
though they do not understand the language, may be held unconscionable).
18. Most listings are for a period of 90 days. FrC REPORT, supra note 1, at
(NFO Survey) seller question 45. The majority of MLS's are controlled by local
realtor boards. Of the MLS's surveyed for the FTC, 84% provide forms for use in
creating the broker/seller relationship and 21% require that their forms be used.
FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 131. In theory, all of these contract terms are "nego-
tiable." However, due to consumer inexperience and the prevalent failure to con-
sult an attorney in this stage of the residential real estate transaction (at least in
most western states), the negotiation of listing contract terms is more of an ideal
than a reality. The American Bar Association has expressly recognized that a law-
markably, the National Association of Realtors (NAR) deems
such broad standardization a matter of ethical duty.' 9 Since
these elements are so vital to the efficiency and effectiveness of
efforts to procure a suitable buyer, one would reasonably expect
the seller to be at least cognizant of what it is he has agreed to
pay for. However, many listing contracts fail to specify the pre-
cise services to be performed by the broker or to define the legal
relationships between the buyer, seller, and broker.20 Therefore,
buyers often rely heavily on the broker's oral assurances.
C. Controlling Laws
1. Agency Law
Every broker, whether employed to lease, rent, sell or buy real
property, is governed by the phase of contract law known as
agency law.2 1 Since this relationship is often likened to that of a
trustee and beneficiary, a real estate agent has the same obliga-
tions of undivided service and loyalty that the law imposes on a
trustee.22
Normally, an agency relationship is created between the seller
yer's approval should be obtained before the seller signs a listing agreement and
"in theory, a new contract should be drawn each time a broker is employed."
Casner, Residential Real Estate Transactions: The Lawyer's Proper Role - Services
- Compensation, 1978 A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM. ON RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE TRANS-
ACTIONS 3. Many brokers, however, will seek to avoid at all costs the involvement
of lawyers. See id. at 9 (broker's fear of the "overmeticulous attention" lawyers
tend to give contract terms).
19. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. Brokers may be held in violation
of the Code for failing to urge exclusives on their clients. See NAT'L ASS'N OF
REALTORS, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CODE OF EmICS 6-1, at 34 (6th ed. 1976).
20. Only 57.1% of the sellers surveyed for the FTC believed the agent who
handled the sale of their home had provided a written, itemized list of the services
he/she would perform before signing the listing agreement. FrC REPORT, supra
note 1, at (NFO Survey) seller question 59.
21. Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp., 89 IlM. 2d 379, 385, 432 N.E.2d 849,
851 (1982) (broker's relationship to employer is one of agent-principal).
22. Agency is a fiduciary relationship between two persons, resulting from the
consensual delegation from one to another to act on his behalf and (usually) to
exercise some degree of discretion while acting. Skopp v. Weaver, 16 Cal. 3d 432,
439, 546 P.2d 307, 312, 128 Cal. Rptr. 19, 24 (1976) (authority to exercise discretion is
not essential to creation of agency); Gipson v. Davis Realty Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d
190, 206, 30 Cal. Rptr. 253, 262 (1963) (distinguishing features of agency are its rep-
resentative authority and its derivative authority); H. MILLER & M. STARR, CALI-
FORNIA REAL ESTATE LAw § 4:2, at 4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MILLER];
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 3 comments a, c (1958).
Rattray v. Scudder, 28 Cal. 2d 214, 222-23, 169 P.2d 371, 376 (1946) ('"The law of
California imposed on... the real estate agent the same obligation of undivided
service and loyalty that it imposes on a trustee in favor of his beneficiary. Viola-
tion of his trust is subject to the same punitory consequences that are provided for
a disloyal or recreant trustee.") (footnote omitted); Moehling v. W.E. O'Neill Con-
str. Co., 20 Ill. 2d 255, 267, 170 N.E.2d 100, 107 (1960) (fiduciary relationship of prin-
cipal and agent requires full disclosure).
[Vol. 12: 145, 1984] Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
and broker upon signing the listing agreement. 23 More precisely,
a real estate agent might be considered a special agent since a
special agent is often authorized to conduct a single transaction
or a series of transactions not involving continuity of service. 24
However, whether or not the broker is labelled a general agent or
a special agent, the broker has a fiduciary duty to act in the best
interest of, and to obtain the best price and terms possible for his
principal.25 He is bound by good faith and must act with reason-
able diligence and such skill as is ordinarily possessed by persons
of common capacity engaged in the same business. 26
2. Real Estate Law
In addition to agency law, individual state statutes and govern-
mental regulations concerned with the real estate profession
often govern the duties and obligations owed by a broker to his
client. Without exception, each state requires licensing of real es-
tate brokers and salespersons. 27
With regard to professional practices, every state prohibits
false, misleading and deceptive representations by real estate
23. Bau v. Sobut, 50 Ill. App. 3d 732, 737-38, 365 N.E.2d 724, 728 (1977) (even
though a contract of employment is necessary to create an agency relationship be-
tween a broker and an owner, no particular form is required); Dickerson Realtors,
Inc. v. Frewert, 16 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1063, 307 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1974). Normally, in
order to create an agency relationship, all that is necessary is that the broker act
upon the principal's written, oral or implied consent.
24. Stenson v. Thrush, 36 Wash. 2d 726, 728, 219 P.2d 977, 978 (1950) ("A real
estate broker is, generally, a special agent with limited powers and is, therefore,
closely restricted within the terms of his agency."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 3 comment a (1958); 3 Am. JuR. 2d Agency § 6 (1962).
25. Smith v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 227 Ky. 120, 122, 12 S.W.2d 276, 277
(1928) (it is the broker's duty to make an honest and diligent effort to accomplish
the purpose of the agency.); Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 552-53,
236 A.2d 843, 856 (1967) (broker is subject to duty of fidelity, honesty and full dis-
closure); Zwick v. United Farm Agency, Inc., 556 P.2d 508, 511 (Wyo. 1976). The du-
ties and obligations a broker owes to his principal are the same as those owed by
any agent to his principal. See Currier, supra note 3, at 661-62.
26. Smith, 227 Ky. at 122, 12 S.W.2d at 277. "The broker is ... under a duty to
possess and employ that degree of skill in the business that is usually possessed
and exercised by persons professing that particular calling." Id. See H. MILLER,
supra note 22, at § 4.
27. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 3101. "Each state has a dual licensing sys-
tem, one for brokers and another for salespersons .... Applicants for brokers'
licenses are usually required to have proportionately more education and experi-
ence than those for salespersons' licenses." Id.
See also id. at 18, app. B § 1 for a more detailed discussion of proscriptions and
requirements contained in the licensing laws.
licensees. 28 Generally, without reference to a statutory code of
ethics, most states proscribe any conduct demonstrating incompe-
tency, bad faith, dishonesty or like characteristics. 29 Various
sanctions for violations of these statutes exist, ranging from sus-
pension or revocation of a license to imposition of criminal penal-
ties such as fines or imprisonment. 30
Additionally, throughout the states, licensure statutes establish
regulatory agencies to enforce these statutory provisions and to
oversee the licensing process. Generally, industry members serve
on designated commissions or boards. However, more than half
the state statutes provide that at least one non-licensed represen-
tative of the public must serve on these commissions or boards.31
3. Code of Ethics
Brokers and courts may also refer to the professional code of
ethics for further guidance in determining a broker's duties and
liabilities. The National Association of Realtors (NAR)32 adopted
a code of ethics in 1913 in order to provide a helpful guide to all
real estate professionals. 33 The various articles within the Code
espouse the prevailing industry view on how the broker/client re-
lationship is best handled.34 For instance, article seven 35 pledges
28. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. See, e.g., CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10176
(West 1964).
29. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 16. See, e.g., CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 10177(a)-(1) (West 1964).
30. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 3102. See, e.g., CAl. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 10175, 10185 (West 1964). Section 10175 states: "Upon grounds provided in this
article and the other articles of this chapter, the license of any real estate licensee
may be revoked or suspended in accordance with the provisions of this part relat-
ing to hearings." Section 10185 states in pertinent part: "Any person .. .who
wilfully violates or knowingly participates in the violation of any provisions of this
division or of the rules and regulations of the commissioner .. .is guilty of a
misdemeanor."
31. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 178.
32. The National Association of Realtors (NAR) is the parent organization for
local real estate groups. Organized in 1908, the NAR was originally known as the
National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB) until it changed its name in
1974. See generally Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as
Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1325-28 (1970). See also FTC REPORT, supra
note 1, at 136-57.
33. See National Association of Realtors Code of Ethics (1974), reprinted in E.
ICEK, supra note 14, at 225-28.
34. Article 6 emphasizes the industry view that the seller is best represented
when the REALTOR obtains an exclusive listing on the property. It is presumed
that the possibility for "dissension and misunderstanding" are too great where
more than one agent is attempting to satisfy the owner's need for service.
Article 8 prohibits a REALTOR from accepting compensation from more than
one party unless all parties to the transaction have been informed of the fact of
dual representation.
Article 9 compels REALTORS to "avoid misrepresentation, or concealment of
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the REALTOR36 to "protect and promote the interests of his cli-
ent." Even though this obligation is considered primary, the bro-
ker is not relieved of his duty to treat all parties to the transaction
fairly.3 7
While case law pertaining to a broker's relationship with his cli-
ent may be somewhat difficult for a broker to interpret without
the aid of a lawyer, the Code of Ethics sets out in simple and
sometimes direct terms, important guidelines for a broker to act
upon. Former legal counsel for NAR, William North, observed
that none of the classical legal relationships appeared to solve the
"identity crisis of the broker."38 He further stated:
By his commitment to the REALTOR's Code of Ethics [the REALTOR]
clearly defines his duty to his seller, his purchaser, his fellow broker and
to the public.
Realtors abandoned for themselves and those with whom they deal, the
rule of caveat emptor in 1913 when the Code of Ethics was adopted.
3 9
Although the Code replaced caveat emptor, the duties of a broker
are not "clearly defined" by the Code.
III. APPLICATION
A uniform application of statutes, codes, and government regu-
lations to the problem of broker liability is more easily affected by
the courts than the application of agency principles. This is due
in part to the number of different agency theories applied, includ-
pertinent facts," and impresses an affirmative obligation on the REALTOR to in-
spect for any adverse factor that a diligent investigation would disclose.
Article 12 requires a REALTOR to specifically disclose "to all affected parties"
any self-interest he has in the transaction. This provision appears to be specifl-
cally aimed at problems such as withholding the listing from the MLS and cooper-
ation with other brokers, thereby allowing the listing broker to avoid the splitting
of commissions.
Article 13 prohibits the undisclosed direct or indirect purchase of property by
the broker.
Finally, Article 22 authorizes the listing broker to cooperate with other brokers
in finding an acceptable buyer for the listed property. Interestingly enough, this
provision requires the cooperating broker working with a prospective purchaser to
refrain from any direct contact with the seller unless done with the consent of the
listing broker.
35. National Association of Realtors Code of Ethics, art. 7 (1974).
36. Members of local real estate boards who are affiliated with NAR are known
as REALTORS. "REALTOR" is a registered trademark of NAR and only members
of NAR may be identified as such. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 137-38.
37. Id.
38. North, Identity Crisis REALTOR Style, REAL ESTATE TODAY Nov.-Dec. 1973,
at 48, 55.
39. Id.
ing subagency,40 dual agency, agency based on the public interest
theory,41 and agency implied in fact.42 As a result of the less-
than-consistent application of these legal theories, a number of
problems have arisen. These problems, affecting both the buyer
and seller, will be presented and possible alternative solutions
suggested.
A. Treatment of The Broker/Client Relationship
The broker may fulfill two basic roles in relation to a buyer.
First, although the broker is the seller's listing agent, he may also
assist the buyer in negotiations for the purchase of the property.43
Second, a broker may "cooperate"44 with a listing agent by work-
ing primarily with the buyer, exposing him to the listed property
and negotiating the purchase of the property for him.45
Each role is distinct from the other and the degree of buyer reli-
ance invoked necessarily varies according to the role assumed by
the broker. Yet absent special factors or agreements, the law has
tended to treat the broker acting in both roles as either the agent
or subagent of the seller, owing fiduciary duties only to him.46
The treatment of the seller/broker relationship is premised
upon the presumption that the seller pays the broker's commis-
sion. Theoretically speaking, this may appear to be accurate since
the commission is normally disbursed from the gross proceeds of
the sale due the seller at the close of escrow. The seller's respon-
sibility for payment of the commission, and the buyer's apparent
noninvolvement, is strong evidence tending to show that the bro-
ker or brokers involved in the transaction are employed by the
seller. Absent a strong showing otherwise, this evidence supports
the theory that the broker owes fiduciary duties solely to the
seller.47
40. See i~tfra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 119-33 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
43. For instance, a prospective purchaser may notice an advertisement which
the listing broker has placed in a local newspaper and decide to inspect the prop-
erty alone. Should this prospective purchaser enter into an agreement to
purchase the property without seeking aid from an outside source, only one bro-
ker will be involved in the transaction. Therefore, only one professional will be
available for advice and guidance to both parties.
44. "Cooperation broker" is a term of art derived from a clause in the multiple
listing agreement permitting member brokers to assist or cooperate in the
purchase and sale of a property listed by another broker.
45. Sixty-six percent of sales involving brokers also involve cooperating bro-
kers. F'C REPORT, supra note 1, at (NFO Survey) seller question 52, and figure I-
1, p.8 .
46. See infra notes 65-84 and accompanying text.
47. See infra note 71.
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However, a more pragmatic approach to this issue might reveal
that in actuality the buyer is responsible for at least a portion of
the commission paid. The purchase price that the buyer pays
more often than not comprises some, if not all, of the commission
fee charged. The FTC queried buyers as to the single most impor-
tant reason prospective purchasers might inspect homes for sale
by owners. 48 A total of 45.8% of the buyers stated that the pri-
mary reason was the expected reduced cost due specifically to the
lack of realtor/broker services.49 An additional 31.5% of the buy-
ers felt that homes for sale by owners were generally less expen-
sive.50 This data indicates that when the majority of buyers elect
to inspect and buy homes listed by a broker, they are aware of the
seller's fixed costs for brokerage services and are willing to pay
the increased market price for the property reflecting that cost.
It logically follows that since a buyer pays the whole of the
purchase price, he is involved in the compensation of the broker
and should be entitled to some type of agent representation.
Nonetheless, this reasoning is seldom adopted.51 Since it is the
seller who has the formal relationship with the broker via the list-
ing agreement, it is the seller to whom the fiduciary obligations
are owed.52
An extensive nationwide study commissioned by the FTC re-
vealed that the discrepancy between a buyer's expectation of fidu-
ciary representation and the legal status the law gives to that
relationship results in at least three distinct problems for the
buyer: "non-disclosure to the buyer of the broker's position,
under-representation, and lack of legal responsibility of the bro-
48. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at (NFO Survey) buyer question 21.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. The court in Duffy v. Setchell, 38 Ill. App. 3d 146, 149, 347 N.E.2d 218, 221
(1976), stated:
If a buyer requests a broker's assistance in obtaining a particular piece of
property, the broker may be held to be the buyer's agent for that transac-
tion, even though the broker is paid nothing by the buyer and it is ex-
pected that he will receive a fee from the seller.
52. Huttig v. Nessy, 100 Fla. 1097, 1102-03, 130 So. 605, 607 (1930) (per curiam);
Linnemann v. Summers, 95 N.J. Eq. 507, 509, 123 A. 539, 540 (1924); Brink v. Martin,
50 Wash. 2d 256, 310 P.2d 870, 871-72 (1957). Although an agent may act gratui-
tously, (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 16 (1958)), most brokers earn their
living from commissions gained through real estate transactions. Therefore, it is
difficult to overcome the presumption that the seller, who pays the commission, is
the principal.
ker to the buyer."53
1. Existing Problems
a. Non-disclosure of the Broker's Position
Rarely will a buyer discuss with a broker the duties and legal
obligations that are owed to him. 54 Nor is it customary for any
type of employment contract to be signed between a buyer and a
broker. However, as aforementioned, the very nature of the rela-
tionship between a purchaser and a broker invokes a purchaser's
reliance and trust.55
For example, buyers often spend a considerable amount of time
with a broker inspecting various properties while relating detailed
personal information about their own needs, preferences and
lifestyles. The unsophisticated buyer may never suspect, and
consequently never question, that the law generally does not rec-
ognize a legal relationship between himself and the broker.
b. Underrepresentation of the Buyer
Certainly a buyer is free to engage or hire a separate broker in
order to secure undivided professional advice, guidance and rep-
resentation. However, the fee normally charged for this type of
representation is separate from any of the other costs the buyer
will incur when he purchases the property. This is because the
commission fee the seller is obligated to pay is not offset by the
buyer's payment for his own professional representation. The ad-
ded cost, coupled with the fact that most buyers do not even real-
ize that they are underrepresented, deters buyers from seeking
and hiring separate agents.
National Family Opinion, Inc. (NFO) surveyed parties that had
been involved in a real estate transaction and asked, "Who do you
think the agent who handled the purchase of your house was rep-
resenting?" 56 A total of fifty-seven percent of the buyers believed
that the broker with whom they dealt represented them. 57 Where
53. B. BROWN & E. GREEN, THE ROLE OF THE BROKER IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ES-
TATE TRANSACTIONS 3 (1979) (Report to the FI'C on the status of state agency law
as it affects the role of residential real estate brokers).
54. See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
55. Buyers were asked to identify the single most influential source of infor-
mation used to determine the price that they offered the seller. Twenty-one per-
cent identified the source as the advice of their broker. Another 17.5% stated
comparable sales information provided by the broker. FTC REPORT, supra note 1,
at (NFO Survey) buyer question 33. Almost 67% of buyers surveyed agreed that
they "relied on [their] agent's advice a great deal when making decisions about
purchasing [their] house." Id. at (NFO Survey) buyer question 53.
56. Id. at (NFO Survey) buyer questions 46a, 46b.
57. Id. Forty-five percent of the buyers had participated in transactions in-
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a cooperating broker was involved, seventy-one percent of the
buyers thought that the cooperating broker represented their
interests.5 8
The infrequent nature of real estate transactions is probably
the primary reason why consumer knowledge of the legal intrica-
cies of the transaction is so low. This lack of experience enhances
the dependence a consumer invariably places upon a broker. Un-
fortunately, due to the problem of nondisclosure, a buyer's reli-
ance may be legally misplaced.
c. Lack of Legal Responsibility Owed the Buyer
Despite the obvious reliance a buyer may place on a broker,
courts have traditionally held that the rule of caveat emptor ap-
plied to the relationship between a broker and a buyer in a real
estate transaction.5 9 Since the law attaches great significance to a
fiduciary relationship created between an agent and a principal,
the nonexistence of an agency relationship between a buyer and
broker may leave a buyer remediless, or at least at a serious legal
disadvantage in the event something goes wrong before or after
the closing of escrow.
Due to the recognition of this problem and others, the trend has
been toward avoiding the strict application of agency law.60 How-
ever, as will be discussed, even though many cases have found a
remedy for a wronged buyer, the duties and obligations a broker
volving one broker; about 53% participated in a transaction involving a cooperating
broker.
58. Id. at (NFO Survey) buyer question 69.
59. Brink, 50 Wash. 2d at 256, 310 P.2d at 871-72. The court held that brokers
"were agents of the owners, and not agents of the prospective purchasers. They
owed no duty to the prospective purchasers to prepare an enforcible contract."
Huttig, 100 Fla. at 1104, 130 So. at 608 (since purchaser was not principal of agent,
he had no legal interest in how much agent received for making the sale); Handy
v. Garmaker, 324 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Minn. 1982). The inevitable compromising of one
or both parties' interests has often caused dual agencies to be held against public
policy whether or not fraud is involved or a party has suffered any injury; Lin-
nemann, 95 N.J. Eq. at 509-10, 123 A. at 540 (real estate agent bought property from
seller and resold it to purchaser for a secret profit); Buckley v. Hatupin, 198 Wash.
543, 556, 89 P.2d 212, 217 (1939) ("[H]owever unethical respondent's conduct may
have been, appellants have no legal ground for recovery of judgment against
him."); Id. See also Comment, Caveat Emptor, The Doctrine's Stronghold, 1 WuL-
LAME'rE L.J. 369 (1960).
60. Collins v. Philadelphia Oil Co., 97 Va. 464, 125 S.E. 223, (1924) (false repre-
sentation as to owner's lowest price is actionable fraud). See also Comment, A
Real Estate Broker's Duty to His Purchaser: Washington State's Position and
Some Projections for the Future, 17 GoNz. L. REV. 79 (1981); Note, Theories of Real
owes the buyer have not yet been well defined.6 1 As a result, not
only has the buyer's position remained insecure, but the seller's
position, once so well defined, has also become somewhat
muddled.
B. The Legal Theories
1. Subagency
Ordinarily, a buyer looking for a home will seek professional
help.62 Sometimes the selection is made by referral63 or because
the broker is a friend or relative. 64 When the buyer enlists the aid
of a broker unassociated with the listed property, the broker is
said to "cooperate" with the listing agent in the sale transaction.
Essentially, this term refers to the real estate profession's estab-
lished practice of utilizing a Multiple Listing Service (MLS).65 If
a property is listed with the MLS,66 the broker has basically
Estate Broker Liability: Arizona's Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 Amiz. L. REV.
767 (1978).
Contra Sawyer v. Tildahl, 275 Minn. 457, 148 N.W.2d 131 (1967) (action to recover
damages for misrepresentations made by brokers); Gilbey v. Cooper, 37 Ohio
Misc. 119, 310 N.E.2d 268 (1973) (willful misrepresentation by failure to disclose
easements). See Carrel v. Lux, 101 Ariz. 430, 420 P.2d 564 (1966) (action against
broker for fraudulent representations as to rents, profits and income); Sanders v.
Stevens, 23 Ariz. 370, 376, 203 P. 1083, 1085 (1922) (false representation as to
owner's lowest price is not a material fact and does not constitute actionable
fraud); Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959) (action against brokers
to recover secret profits).
61. See infra notes 62-133 and accompanying text.
62. Approximately 90% of buyers surveyed by the NFO utilized the profes-
sional services of a broker. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at (NFO Survey) buyer
question 10.
63. "Referral" in this sense means that the client was directed toward the par-
ticular broker either through a non-professional source (for example, a former cli-
ent who had been satisfied with the services rendered by the broker) or through a
professional source (perhaps as a professional courtesy from one broker to
another).
64. The NFO survey also indicated that 22.9% of those buyers selected their
broker by referral; 26.9% selected the broker because he was a friend or relative.
FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at (NFO Survey) buyer question 15a.
65. The FTC consumer survey found that almost 92% of sellers utilizing the
services of brokers have their property listed on an MLS. Id. at (NFO Survey)
screener question 13.
See Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Ser-
vice, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071, 1074-75 (D.N.J. 1976) (court describes widespread use
of MLS services); see, e.g., Wheatly Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Re-
sales Co., 447 F. Supp. 838, 840 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("The part played by MLS listings
in the sale of residential properties within its business area is substantial."). See
generally Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints
of Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1326-30 (1970).
66. A property is usually listed through the MLS by way of an exclusive right
to sell the listing. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at (NFO Survey) MLS survey ques-
tion H2 and B9. See also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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agreed to pool his listing with others and split his commission
with the cooperating broker.
In Derish v. San Mateo-Burlingame Board of Realtors,67 the Cal-
ifornia Court of Appeal described the MLS as a facility whose ul-
timate purpose is the formation of subagency relationships.68 The
practical effect of the MLS can be beneficial to the buyer, seller,
and broker.69 However, the legal ramifications of the MLS con-
cept and the resulting subagency relationships created between
the seller, listing broker and cooperating broker,70 are actually ad-
verse to the best interests of the buyer.
In most real estate transactions, the cooperating agent is considered to be
a subagent of the seller and therefore bound to the same fiduciary obliga-
tions to the seller. The fiduciary obligation carries with it a duty to act in
the best interest of the seller in all respects and that of course includes
negotiating a contract for the seller on the best terms and at the best price
obtainable. Therefore, neither the listing nor the selling agent should sug-
gest to a prospective purchaser terms less favorable to the seller than the
terms set forth in the listing agreement unless the seller has given ap-
proval to this tactic.7 1
The practical effect of this arrangement leaves the buyer in a
67. 136 Cal. App. 3d 534, 186 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1982). The Derish opinion repre-
sents the first express recognition by California courts that an MLS is a facility for
the extension of blanket unilateral offers of subagency appointments.
68. Id. at 541, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
69. Use of the multiple has had significant impact on the real estate indus-
try as a whole. This impact is manifested in the reduction of the obstacles
brokers must face in adjusting supply to demand: market imperfections
are overcome in that information and communication barriers are re-
duced, along with the easing of the built-in geographical barrier con-
fronting the buyer-seller relationship. Moreover, a realistic price structure
is engendered. In effect, real estate becomes by virtue of the multiple, "a
more liquid commodity."
Austin, supra note 65, at 1329 (footnotes omitted).
70. MILLER, supra note 22, at § 4:8; Granberg v. Turnham, 166 Cal. App. 2d 390,
333 P.2d 423 (1958) (court held listing broker liable for wrongful acts of cooperating
broker); Kruse v. Miller, 143 Cal. App. 2d 656, 300 P.2d 855 (1956) (even though bro-
ker had no dealing with principal in relation to the listing or sale of the property,
defendant was acting with the express permission of the listing agent and was,
therefore, a subagent).
Contra Walters v. Marler, 83 Cal. App. 3d 1, 147 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1978) (a broker
employed by a prospective buyer owes a fiduciary duty to that buyer even though
the broker cooperates with a listing broker and his commission will be paid by the
seller); Wise v. Dawson, 353 A.2d 207 (Del. 1975) (multilisting arrangement be-
tween listing and selling broker is not an agency relationship for purposes of im-
posing liability on listing agent for misrepresentation made by a cooperating agent
unless clearly proven otherwise); Blocklinger v. Schlegel, 58 Ill. App. 3d 324, 374
N.E.2d 491 (1978) (court holds that cooperating broker was not employed by owner
and therefore owed no greater duty to seller than owed the public at large).
71. CA uroRiA REAL ESTATE, March 1979, at 51.
peculiarly vulnerable legal position. While the buyer is not repre-
sented at all, the seller is represented by both brokers. Counsel
for the NAR observed: "Often a purchaser's only available source
of expertise and information is his seller's brokers. ' 72 There ap-
pears to be no logical reason for the denial of adequate represen-
tation of the buyer, other than the dubious value of strict
adherence to agency law.
The better view appeared in Blocklinger v. Schlegel,73 where the
purchaser, who was also a broker, brought suit against the ven-
dors for specific performance of a real estate contract.7 4 The de-
fendant vendors claimed that the plaintiff breached a fiduciary
duty owed to them as sellers and that the resulting constructive
fraud was sufficient grounds for rescission.75 The basis of the ar-
gument was that since the property was listed on the MLS, the
plaintiff broker allegedly became a subagent for the defendant
sellers.7 6 As a subagent, the plaintiff would have owed fiduciary
duties to the defendants, including the duty to disclose his occu-
pation as a realtor and his particular expertise as to land values. 77
After examining the MLS agreement, the Illinois Appellate Court
found that no fiduciary duty existed between the plaintiff and de-
fendant because there was no existing contractual privity be-
tween these parties.7 8 Referring to the tenuous relationship
between a broker and seller created by the MLS concept, the
court stated that "the business of being a realtor is not one con-
taining an element of public interest so as to require him to deal
as a fiduciary with everyone." 79
It should be noted that the views expressed in both Blocklinger
and Derish may, in some cases, favor a buyer's interests and ironi-
cally work against the seller's best interest. All statements, omis-
sions, and misrepresentations made by the seller's subagent will
be attributed to the seller.80 In Johnston v. Seargeants,81 the
seller was held responsible for the cooperating broker's misrepre-
sentations concerning existing termite infestation. The court held
that any representation made by the cooperating broker was also
72. North, supra note 38, at 53.
73. 58 IlM. App. 3d 324, 374 N.E.2d 491 (1978).
74. Id. at 325, 374 N.E.2d at 492.
75. Id. at 326, 374 N.E.2d at 492.
76. Id. at 326, 374 N.E.2d at 493.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 327, 374 N.E.2d at 493.
79. Id. at 326, 374 N.E.2d at 493. Accord Wise, 353 A.2d at 209 ("[A] multilist
arrangement between listing and selling agents is not an agency relationship un-
less clearly proven otherwise.").
80. See MnLER, supra note 22, at §§ 4:8, 4:28 (role of the cooperating broker and
liability of the principal to third parties for acts of the agent).
81. 152 Cal. App. 2d 180, 313 P.2d 41 (1957).
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the representation of the listing agent.82 As the seller was respon-
sible for her agent's statements, the plaintiff/buyer was granted
rescission.
In addition to pointing out the seller's vicarious liability for his
subagent's statements, the Johnston case is unique in that both
the listing and the cooperating brokers were known by the seller
to be seeking an acceptable buyer. The more typical case arises
where the seller has had absolutely no direct contact with the co-
operating broker.8 3 Despite the fact that the seller has virtually
no control over the selection of the subagent (since any broker
with access to the MLS may assume that role), and has made no
personal instructions to the character evaluation of the subagent,
he is nonetheless required, as a principal, to account for the coop-
erating broker's wrongdoing.84
Clearly, this over-exposure to liability would be eliminated (and
the buyer's representation enhanced) if the cooperating broker
was considered to be the buyer's agent. In light of the possible
consequences, the listing broker should be required at a mini-
mum to specifically disclose that authorization to cooperate with
other brokers exposes the seller to an increase in potential
liability.
2. Dual Representation
Through the ages it has long been recognized that "[n o servant
can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one and love the
other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other."85
Undaunted by the obvious truth of this maxim, two basic situa-
tions have developed in which a broker may legally act in the in-
terest of both the buyer and the seller.
a. Middleman
82. Id. at 187, 313 P.2d at 46.
83. See supra note 44. As previously mentioned, article 22 of the Realtor Code
of Ethics requires that direct contact between the seller and the cooperating bro-
ker be avoided in negotiations (unless approved by the listing broker). See Gran-
berg, 166 Cal. App. 2d 390, 395, 333 P.2d 423, 426 (1958) (seller was forced to return
buyer's downpayment when sale arranged by cooperating brokers, with whom
seller was not acquainted, was rescinded due to cooperating brokers' misrepresen-
tation of the property's zoning).
84. Further, the seller (and listing broker) may be bound by "admissions"
made by the subagent (cooperating broker). See FED. R. EvID. 801(d) (2) (D).
85. Luke 16:13.
In order to avoid placing the broker in the compromising posi-
tion of representing the inherently incongruent interests of buy-
ers and sellers, a limited number of courts have cast the role of a
broker as analogous to that of a middleman. 86 This characteriza-
tion limits the duties of a broker to simply bringing the parties to-
gether, and proscribes the broker's participation in the
negotiation of the transaction.8 7 However, due to the complexity
of real estate transactions, limiting the broker's participation to a
middleman status is both unnecessary 88 and illogical. 89 Rather
than one party being underrepresented or not represented, the re-
sult of classifying a broker as a middleman is simply that neither
party is represented at all.
b. Dual Agency
The more recurring and problematic situation exists where a
broker takes it upon himself to attempt the representation of both
the buyer's and the seller's best interest. The Realtor Code of
Ethics places virtually no restrictions on the representation of
multiple principals in a real estate transaction.90 As listing agent,
the broker is under a fiduciary duty to negotiate for and represent
the best interests of the seller.9 1 This invariably concerns ob-
86. See, e.g., Harry M. Fine Realty Co. v. Stiers, 326 S.W.2d 392, 398 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1959).
87. A broker is simply a middleman... when he has no duty to perform
but to bring the parties together, leaving them to negotiate and to come to
an agreement themselves without any aid from him. If he takes .. . any
part in the negotiations, however, he cannot be regarded as a mere mid-
dleman, no matter how slight a part it may be.
Jensen v. Bowen, 37 N.D. 352, 358, 164 N.W. 4, 5 (1917). See also Spratlin, Harring-
ton & Thomas, Inc. v. Hawn, 116 Ga. App. 175, 156 S.E.2d 402 (1967) (broker was not
determined a middleman where he aided defendants in obtaining a loan, gave ad-
vice as to the amount and terms of the loan defendants were seeking, or in other
aspects was active for parties to the transaction); Van Leeuwen v. Huffaker, 78
Utah 521, 5 P.2d 714 (1931); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 258 comment d
(1958).
88. Mallory v. Watt, 100 Idaho 119, 594 P.2d 629 (1979) (a broker is not required
to act as a mere middleman so long as full disclosure of dual agency and fair treat-
ment of the principals is afforded).
89. Stambler & Stein, The Real Estate Broker - Schizophrenia or Conflict of In-
terests, 28 D.C.B.J. 16, 17 (1961) (the broker is the active go-between; the direction
and details of the transaction are personal knowledge of the broker).
90. The Code simply provides that the broker must act in the interests of his
client(s) and deal with all parties involved in a fair manner. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
91. George Ball Pac., Inc. v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 117 Cal. App. 3d 248, 256,
172 Cal. Rptr. 597, 601 (1981) (citing Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 Cal. 3d 773,
782, 598 P.2d 45, 50, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 397 (1979)) ("A real estate licensee is
'charged with the duty of fullest disclosure of all material facts concerning the
transaction that might affect the principal's decision.' "); Alhino v. Starr, 112 Cal.
App. 3d 158, 169, 169 Cal. Rptr. 136, 143 (1980). 'The law imposes on a real estate
'agent the same obligation of undivided services and loyalty that it imposes on a
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taining the highest price and best terms possible for the seller.
Conversely, a buyer's interest, among other things, would include
obtaining the property at a bargain price and on terms most
favorable to a purchaser. Despite this conflict of interests, the
broker is allowed to simultaneously act as an agent for the
buyer,92 forming an uneasy dual agency alliance.
The courts have long been unwilling to recognize the legitimacy
of the dual agency relationship 93 in the absence of full disclosure
to both the buyer and seller.9 4 Additionally, the broker must dis-
close any material facts that would reasonably affect the judg-
ment of the principal in permitting the dual agency.95
trustee in favor of his beneficiary."' Id. (quoting Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d
662, 674-75, 411 P.2d 101, 108, 68 Cal. Rptr. 589, 597 (1968)).
92. Brimbau v. Ausdale Equip. Rental Corp., 440 A.2d 1292, 1296 (R.I. 1982) (a
person may serve simultaneously as the agent of two independent principals);
Utah State Univ. of Agriculture and Applied Sciences v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715,
722 (Utah 1982) ("It is not necessarily always true that a party acting as an agent
in a transaction must be exclusively the agent of one party or the other.").
93. This situation must be distinguished from the case in which the broker
represents the seller as to one parcel of land, and represents the buyer in a subse-
quent sale of another parcel. In Fred Tuke & Son v. Burkhardt, 7 Ohio Op. 2d 324,
156 N.E.2d 490 (1958), affd, 109 Ohio App. 183, 160 N.E.2d 283 (1959), plaintiff/real
estate agency was hired by, and found a purchaser for defendant/seller's house.
Defendant refused to pay the commission on the grounds that plaintiff's subagent
had a contract with the intended purchaser to sell another parcel of land for him,
and that this "dual agency" (not in the usual sense where an agent represents
both buyer and seller with regard to the same parcel) had not been disclosed. The
court held that the agent was under no legal duty to make such a disclosure
(though it would have been highly ethical) and ordered plaintiff's commission to
be paid. Id. at 185, 160 N.E.2d at 285.
94. Cogan v. Kidder, Matthews & Sehner, Inc., 97 Wash. 2d 658, 662, 648 P.2d
875, 877 (1982) ("Where an agent has dual responsibilities or is serving an interest
adverse to the principal, disclosure of such conflict is always required."); Mersky
v. Multiple Listing Bureau, 73 Wash. 2d 225, 437 P.2d 897 (1968) (it is of no conse-
quence that the failure to disclose dual relation did not involve intentional or de-
liberate fraud, did not result in injury to principal, or did not affect principal's
ultimate decisions in the transaction). Accord Duffy v. Setchel, 38 Ill. App. 3d 146,
347 N.E.2d 218 (1976). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 392 (1958);
Warren v. Magels Realty, 23 Ariz. App. 318, 321, 533 P.2d 78, 81 (1975); Mallory v.
Watt, 100 Idaho 119, 122, 594 P.2d 629, 632 (1979); Brandt v. Koepnick, 2 Wash. App.
671, 674, 469 P.2d 189, 190-91 (1970).
Also, brokers are often required by state statute to disclose any dual agency sit-
uations. See, e.g., CAr. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10176(d) (West Supp. 1984). If a bro-
ker continues in a dual agency without notifying both parties, he thereby forfeits
his commission, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 389, 391 (1958), and may
even lose his license. Hickan v. Colorado Real Estate Comm'n, 36 Colo. App. 76,
534 P.2d 1220 (1975).
95. Koller v. Belote, 12 Wash. App. 194, 528 P.2d 1000 (1974) (broker did not dis-
close impossibility of securing for defendant/prospective purchasers the best
price and terms available while representing the best interests of seller).
Essentially, dual agency contemplates that the broker can pro-
vide each principal to a real estate transaction undivided loyalty
and full disclosure. Although legal decisions may support and de-
fend this concept, it is logically unclear how a broker may provide
full disclosure to either party without harm or detriment to the in-
terests of the other.96 In some cases, courts have understandably
sought to avoid the inherently conflicting prospect of dual
agency,97 while other courts have strained to establish a dual rela-
tionship between the broker and the parties of the transaction.98
96. The NFO surveys point out some interesting buyer and seller perceptions
of the dual agency relationship. Over 63% of all sellers surveyed believed that
they and the buyer had been represented by the same agent. FTC REPORT, supra
note 1, at (NFO Survey) seller question 52(b). Seventy-four point two percent of
all buyers surveyed shared the same belief. Id. at buyer question 46(b). This data
clearly suggests that most buyers and sellers share an unknowing comfort in al-
lowing dual representation in the residential real estate transaction. As further
evidence of the parties' lack of familiarity with the inherent conflict with which
the broker is faced, 78.7% of all sellers surveyed had told their agent the lowest
price they would accept. FrC REPORT, supra note 9, at (NFO Survey) seller ques-
tion 60(k). Seventy-three percent of all buyers surveyed had likewise indicated
the highest price that they would bid. Id. at (NFO Survey) buyer question 53(k).
The broker's plight at this point is apparent. In any given case, he must either opt
for the role of a middleman, or proceed to advise and negotiate the parties through
an inevitable compromise of loyalties and interests.
Since a major goal of most sellers is to obtain the highest price for their home,
FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at (NFO Survey) seller question 14(j), negotiations will
hinge, to a large degree, on the buyer's perception of how low a price the seller is
willing to accept. However, the NFO survey further points out that 62% of the
buyers surveyed reported that their agent had revealed how low he thought the
seller would go. Id. at (NFO Survey) buyer question 53(d). It appears that these
buyers were indeed represented well, but only at the expense and breach of the
broker's duty of loyalty to the seller in obtaining the highest and best price possi-
ble. Comment, A Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Relation-
ship, 18 WAYNE I REV. 1343, 1351 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Reexamination].
Furthermore, even if the seller had been more alert to this conflict and the princi-
ples of agency law involved, the dual representation is likely to work injury to his
interests. A seller who understands agency law may hold back information, such
as the acceptable price range, that will be necessary for the broker to know in ful-
filling his duty to the seller, but that he is afraid the buyer will find out. Currier,
supra note 3, at 675. The FrC survey clearly points out that this fear is not ill
founded.
Just as it breaches a duty to seller when his agent tells the buyer how low a
price a seller is willing to accept, in a dual agency situation, an agent breaches his
fiduciary duty to the buyer when he tells the seller how high he thinks the buyer
will go. Transmittal of this information will inevitably compromise the buyer's in-
terest in obtaining the lowest price possible in negotiations. "Comments to the
Restatement of Agency state that the dual agent does not violate a duty to one
principal by fully disclosing all relevant facts to the other; however, when confi-
dential information, such as statement about price, is given to the agent by the
principal, the agent's duty compels his silence." Id. at 676 (footnote omitted). See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 392 comment b (1958).
97. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
98. See iyfra notes 99-133 and accompanying text.
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i. Fiduciary duties owed without express recognition of an
agency relationship.
In Harper v. Adametz,99 the broker failed to disclose the buyer's
offer to the seller. Instead, the broker purchased the property
through a relative and then subdivided the property, selling a por-
tion to the prospective purchaser and conveying the remaining
portion to his son. The broker failed to disclose his purchase and
secret profit.00 The court held that a constructive trust be placed
on the property in the buyer's name:10 1
It is true that this rule is most often applied in situations where the rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and the defendant is one which equity
clearly recognizes as fiduciary. But equity has carefully refrained from
defining a fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in such a manner as
to exclude new situations. It has left the bars down for situations in
which there is a justifiable trust confided on one side and a resulting supe-
riority and influence on the other.10 2
Clearly, the above situation can easily be distinguished from
the situation where no fraud on the part of the broker can be
found. However, courts have attempted to ameliorate the other-
wise inequitable position of the buyer by straining the fiduciary
concept to create a fiduciary duty applicable to the broker/buyer
relationship, even where the broker is already the agent of the
seller.
For instance, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Funk v.
Ti ft03 that when a real estate broker acts as an intermediary be-
tween a seller and prospective buyer, the broker has a fiduciary
obligation to deal fairly and honestly with the prospective
buyer.10 4 In this case, the broker had failed to disclose to a pro-
spective buyer that he, along with two other parties, had submit-
ted a subsequent (and substantially more generous) offer to the
prospective purchaser's offer.105 Tifft had disclosed his role as
agent of the vendor, and no allegation of fraudulent misrepresen-
tation or confidential information existed.1 06 However, the major-
ity relied on a number of cases which, in fact, dealt with
situations where the broker was in a relationship with the pro-
99. 142 Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955).
100. Id. at 221, 113 A.2d at 137-38.
101. Id. at 225, 113 A.2d at 139.
102. Id.
103. 515 F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1975).
104. Id. at 25.
105. Id. at 24.
106. Id. at 28 (Wright, J., dissenting).
spective buyer,107 made affirmative misrepresentations,108 and
misused confidential information.109
As the dissent noted, the court's decision was the first to hold a
broker liable for breach of affirmative duties owing to a buyer in
which the broker was not the buyer's agent, did not make fraudu-
lent or deceitful misrepresentations, and did not conceal or fail to
communicate the buyer's offer. 110 In a conclusory manner, the
court also found that a fiduciary relationship existed."'
Notably, the court never termed the broker the buyer's agent.
The very concept of a fiduciary relationship is allied with a legal
relationship of some type. It may be presumed that the court
sought to avoid categorizing the relationship as one of agency be-
cause of the inherent problems raised when dual agency relation-
ships are applied in real estate transactions.
ii. Agency implied-in-fact
Alternatively, rather than avoiding the recognition of an agency
relationship, some courts have found a dual agency relationship
based on an implied promise to complete the transaction." 2 In
107. See Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 808, 113 So. 419, 421 (1927) (citing Mayrand
v. Mayrand, 194 Ill. 45, 48, 61 N.E. 1040, 1041 (1901)).
The term "fiduciary" or "confidential" relation ... is a very broad one. It
has been said that it exists, and that relief is granted, in all cases in which
influence has been acquired and abused,-in which confidence has been
reposed and betrayed. The origin. . . and the source of the influence are
immaterial. The rule embraces both technical fiduciary relations and
those informal relations which exist whenever one man trusts in and re-
lies upon another.
Id.
Accord Pepper v. Underwood, 48 Cal. App. 3d 698, 122 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1975); Wolf
v. Price, 244 Cal. App. 2d 165, 52 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1966); Mitchell v. Allison, 51 N.M.
315, 183 P.2d 847 (1947) (the assumption by the agent of the undertaking to
purchase and the confidence necessarily reposed in him by the principal, who ac-
cepts the agent's offer to act, instead of acting himself, is the basis of the agent's
liability).
108. See Ward, 51 Cal. 2d at 741-42, 336 P.2d at 537; Quinn, 93 Fla. at 822, 113 So.
at 421-22.
109. Funk, 515 F.2d at 28 (Wright, J., dissenting).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 25. Cf. Darling v. Nineteen-Eighty Corp., 176 N.W.2d 765, 767 (Iowa
1970). Absent property owner's informed consent, owner's agent who also acted as
escrow agent did not thereby become agent of purchaser. Therefore, owner was
not precluded from changing his mind and instructing agent not to consummate
deal after owner had mailed signed contract of sale to agent who had power of
attorney.
112. Harris v. Perl, 41 N.J. 455, 463, 197 A.2d 359, 364 (1964) ("In a practical world
the broker must trust that those who seek or willingly accept his services will not
cheat him of the fruit of his industry. The courts should protect him from that
abuse. . . ."); Tanner Associates, Inc. v. Ciraldo, 33 N.J. 51, 161 A.2d 725 (1960)
(court recognizes an implied agency relationship between the buyer and seller).
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Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson,113 the New Jersey Supreme
Court took judicial notice of the expectations of the parties and
concluded that if the purchaser fails or refuses to consummate a
real estate transaction without valid reason, 114 thereby preventing
the broker from earning a commission, he becomes liable to the
broker for breach of an implied promise.115
Generally, under this view, the broker is considered to be an
agent of the buyer and of the seller." 6 This resembles a finding of
an implied promise in fact or an agreement inferred by con-
duct,1 7 which is the equivalent of an implied agency. 118 Cer-
tainly, in the jurisdictions where a broker may assert an implied
agency relationship, a buyer may do likewise. However, it ap-
pears that the Dobbs court also attempted to avoid labelling the
relationship as one of dual agency.
As highlighted in the foregoing discussion, hindsight creation of
fiduciary duties toward a party never intended as a principal cre-
ates perplexing problems. On one hand, the broker has an estab-
lished agency relationship with the seller. On the other hand, the
uncertainty of the law leaves a broker in the insecure position of
fulfilling vague fiduciary duties toward the buyer in order to avoid
possible future liability. While the courts' decisions in many
cases may seek to remedy a wrong suffered by a buyer, the failure
to define the relationship upon which those duties are based pro-
vides no legal guidance for brokers. Hence, the application of
these theories may actually be more detrimental than beneficial
to a buyer.
113. 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
114. Id. at 559, 236 A.2d at 859; Harris, 41 N.J. at 461, 197 A.2d at 363.
115. But see Joseph J. Murphy Realty, Inc. v. Shervan, 159 N.J. Super. 546, 548-
49, 388 A.2d 990, 991 (1978) (Dobbs'view has eroded somewhat since in New Jersey
it is now held that financial inability to carry out the transaction is not enough
fault by the buyer to allow the broker to sue for his lost commission).
116. California is in accord with the Dobbs principle of purchaser liability. See
Donnellan v. Rocks, 22 Cal. App. 3d 925, 99 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1972). But see Profes-
sional Realty Corp. v. Bender, 216 Va. 737, 738-39, 222 S.E.2d 810, 811 (1976) (pur-
chaser's promise to purchase is not an implied promise to pay commission if he
defaults on contract with vendor).
Other states allow recovery from the buyer only if the buyer acted in bad faith.
See Treadaway v. Piazza, 156 So. 2d 328 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Brawner v. Cumbie,
264 S.W. 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
117. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 19, at 27-30 (1 Vol. ed. 1952); L. SIMP-
SON, LAW OF CONTRACTS § 5, at 8 (1954).
118. 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 50, at 206-08 (1963).
iii. The public interest theory
Where courts have been unable or reluctant to find a fiduciary
duty owed to the buyer by the broker, the "public policy" or "pub-
lic interest" theory has been utilized to impose a duty upon bro-
kers to act in an honest and ethical manner toward buyers.119
This duty is founded upon the theory that state statutes grant a
status to, and make certain responsibilities incumbent upon, li-
censed real estate brokers.120 In these cases, a failure to commu-
nicate the buyer's offer and any affirmative misrepresentations
constituted a breach of the broker's statutory duty to deal fairly
and honestly with prospective purchasers.
In Ward v. Taggart,121 the real estate broker misrepresented to
a prospective purchaser both the seller's minimum price and the
fact that he was the seller's agent. The broker discretely used the
purchaser's money to purchase the land from the seller and then
subsequently resold the subject land to the purchaser at a profit.
The court held that public policy would not allow such fraudulent
activities, despite the fact that no fiduciary or agency relationship
could be established between the buyer and broker. 22 The court
relied on California statutes which concern fraudulent conduct, 23
and real estate brokers.24 Under California law, a broker's li-
cense may be revoked if he violates a state statute by making
false promises likely to persuade, induce or influence. 25 Addi-
tionally, a broker may be required to submit proof of his veracity
and honest character. 26 These statutes impute a duty on the bro-
ker to act in an honest and ethical manner with the general pub-
lic, the intended beneficiaries of the statutes. 27
In Zilchin v. Dill,128 the Florida Supreme Court held that since
119. Ward, 51 Cal. 2d at 736, 336 P.2d at 534; Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla. 96, 25 So. 2d 4
(1946); Amato v. Latter & Blum, Inc., 227 La. 537, 79 So. 2d 873 (1955). See Reexami-
nation, supra note 96, at 1345-48.
120. Ward, 51 Cal. 2d at 736, 336 P.2d at 534.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 741, 336 P.2d at 537.
123. "One who gains a thing by fraud.., or other wrongful act, is, unless he
has some other and better right thereto, an involuntary trustee of the thing gained,
for the benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 2224 (West 1970). "No one can take advantage of his wrong." Id. at § 3517.
124. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10150, 10176 (West 1964), as amended CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 10150, 10176 (West Supp. 1984). Even though § 10150 has been
amended and no longer requires an applicant for a brokerage license to submit
two recommendations certifying their honesty, truthfulness and good character,
§ 10152 has continued to require that this application be submitted on request by
the commission. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10152 (West Supp. 1984).
125. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10176(a), (b) (West Supp. 1984).
126. See supra note 124.
127. Ward, 51 Cal. 2d at 741, 336 P.2d at 537.
128. Zichlin, 157 Fla. at 96, 25 So. 2d at 4.
[Vol. 12: 145, 19841 Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
"a broker belongs to a privileged class and enjoys a monopoly to
engage in a lucrative business," state statutes require that the
broker shall be "competent, honest, truthful, trustworthy, of good
character, and bear a reputation for fair dealing."129 The court
went on to conclude that since the statute prescribed a standard
of qualifications, the rule caveat emptor must not prevail.
3 0
While both Zilchin and Ward involved an affirmative misrepre-
sentation on the part of the broker, in Amato v. Latter & Blum,
Inc.,131 the broker's treatment of the buyer appeared less fraudu-
lent. The defendant broker failed to present the plaintiff's offer
resulting in the sale of the property to another purchaser. The
plaintiff was unable to purchase the property without paying an
exorbitantly inflated price.' 32 The court concluded that public
policy imposed a duty upon a broker to act honestly.133 Thus, it
appears that a broker may have an implied statutory duty to act
in an honest and fair manner, whether or not the purchaser can
prove actionable fraud.
Similar to the hindsight creation of fiduciary duties owed to a
buyer, the public policy theory offers no concrete guidelines on
which a broker may base his conduct. Certainly, some acts are so
inherently dishonest that no statutory definition is needed. How-
ever, since the broker is obligated to act in the best interests of
the seller, there may be situations where the broker's conduct
borders the line between a violation of fiduciary duties owed the
seller, and a violation of public fairness. Non-material disclosures
would easily fall into this category. If the courts continue to sim-
ply "put the fires out" by establishing hindsight fiduciary rela-
tions, brokers will be left in the quandary of choosing between
established fiduciary duties owed the seller and second-guessing
the nebulous professional standards espoused under the public
interest theory.
C. Specific Problem Areas
The practices of self-dealing and vest-pocket listing, and the ab-
sence of brokerage commission rate negotiability and unbiased
real estate valuation, all relate to the consumer's lack of experi-
129. Id. at 98, 25 So. 2d at 4-5.
130. Id.
131. Amato, 227 La. at 537, 79 So. 2d at 873.
132. Id. at 539-40, 79 So. 2d at 874.
133. Id. at 543, 79 So. 2d at 876. See generally Currier, supra note 3.
ence in real estate transactions. Recognition of these problem ar-
eas is essential in any attempt to ensure the efficient and
economically accurate transfer of residential property.
1. Self-Dealing
The real estate broker is brought by his calling into a relation of trust and
confidence. Constant are the opportunities by concealment and collusion
to extract illicit gains. We know from our judicial records that the oppor-
tunities have not been lost.1 3 4
This fact is perhaps best illustrated by the problem of self-deal-
ing. "The self-dealing broker is the seller's agent who directly or
indirectly purchases the seller's house without disclosing his or
her interest in the purchase."135 The general rule has long been
that a broker cannot purchase from his principal unless the latter
assents with full knowledge of the facts. 136 This is currently the
law in at least thirty-seven states. 137
There may be a rare case in which a broker purchase, properly
disclosed, is appropriate. 138 However, "[ s ] elf-dealing is, by defini-
tion, unknown to the consumer," 139 and constitutes a "flagrant vi-
olation of the broker's duty to disclose material facts to the
principal."140 The typical case involves a broker's failure to com-
municate a buyer's offer to a seller after agreeing to do so. He
then buys the property himself and sells it to the buyer at a profit,
with the buyer thinking the purchase is directly from the original
owner. In such a case, the vendor's agent may be held liable to
134. Roman v. Lobe, 243 N.Y. 51, 54, 152 N.E. 461, 462 (1926) (Cardozo, J.).
135. FrC REPORT, supra note 1, at 121. An example of indirect broker self-deal-
ing occurs where the broker fails to disclose that the property is being purchased
by the listing broker's sister for the benefit of the broker and his wife. Abell v.
Watson, 155 Cal. App. 2d 158, 317 P.2d 159 (1957). On the duty of a real estate bro-
ker to disclose that prospective purchaser is a relative, see Annot., 26 A.L.R. 2d
1307 (1952).
136. Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 441 P.2d 101 (1968) (broker failed to dis-
close his intent to purchase through a corporation in which he and his wife were
the sole stockholders); Estrin v. Watson, 150 Cal. App. 2d 107, 309 P.2d 506 (1957)
(listing broker failed to disclose that he was purchasing property under his fic-
ticiously named realty company).
137. See FrC REPORT, supra note 1, at app. B, § 1. This is also the rule of disclo-
sure under the NAR Code of Ethics, art. 13. See supra note 34.
138. For example, when there is a tight money market and adequate bank fi-
nancing for home owners is scarce, the anxious seller may want to sell to a broker
who has the financial resources to make the purchase immediately. The typical
problem arises when the broker already has a ready, willing and able buyer to
whom the broker intends to resell to at a profit. For a discussion of instances
where the seller grants the broker a limited right to purchase the property himself
and the conflicts of interest that arise (in California law), see Comment, Unprofes-
sional Conduct by Real Estate Brokers: Conflict of Interest and Conflict in the
Law, 11 PAC. L.J. 821 (1980).
139. F C REPORT, supra note 1, at 122. Thus, the NFO surveys were incapable
of actually measuring its prevalence with any degree of accuracy.
140. Id. at 314.
[Vol. 12: 145, 1984] Real Estate Broker's Fiduciary Duties
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
the buyer for failure to communicate his offer to the vendor,141
and liable to the seller for failure to reveal that other offers were
made.142
Self-dealing practices are the subject of frequent litigation143
and complaints to state licensing agencies.'" The burden of
showing that any conflict of interest was fully disclosed, and not
just discoverable by a diligent principal, is squarely on the bro-
ker.14 5 If he fails to meet this burden, the broker may forfeit his
commission, 146 lose his profits,147 lose his license,148 and/or be as-
sessed both compensatory and exemplary damages.149 The seller
has the right to rescind the transaction whether or not actual in-
jury was sustained.150
Perhaps the most effective way to prevent broker self-dealing is
for the seller to insist that the listing be immediately placed on
the MLS. In this way, a broker may be discouraged from attempt-
ing to procure illicit gains as he will be cognizant of his fellow col-
leagues' awareness of the listing's existence and status.
141. See, e.g., Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955) (buyer suf-
fered no pecuniary loss but was able to recover on equitable grounds (doctrine of
constructive trusts)); Amato, 227 La. at 537, 79 So. 2d at 873 (real estate agent held
liable for misrepresenting to owner that no higher offer was outstanding; buyer
prevailed).
142. See, e.g., Simone v. McKee, 142 Cal. App. 2d 307, 298 P.2d 667 (1956) (failure
to reveal all offers made is the same as an affirmative representation that no other
offers were made).
143. See CALIFORNIA CEB, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 156, 157
(1967).
144. FTC Interview with R. Arnold, F. Carasko, California Dep't of Real Estate,
in Los Angeles (March 19, 1979).
145. Frisell v. Newman, 2 Wash. App. 85, 467 P.2d 340 (1970) (where cooperating
broker purchased the property for his own salesman's account, the fact that the
seller could have learned of the relationship by reading the contract documents
was insufficient to show that broker had met his duty of disclosure).
146. Berry v. Marx, 206 Ala. 619, 91 So. 583 (1921).
147. Metcalf v. Drew, 78 Cal. App. 2d 226, 177 P.2d 620 (1947) (conspiracy be-
tween broker and buyer to self-deal; plaintiff awarded damages in amount of se-
cret profit less commission).
148. Holland Realty Inv. Co. v. Nevada, 84 Nev. 91, 436 P.2d 422 (1968) (license
revoked for failure to disclose double escrow).
149. Ward, 51 Cal. 2d at 736, 336 P.2d at 534 (defendant, who never even held the
listing, sold certain property in self-dealing at a profit; plaintiff received damages
in full amount of secret profit); Simone, 142 Cal. App. 2d at 307, 298 P.2d at 667
(1956) (compensatory and exemplary damages assessed where broker failed to
disclose second offer to purchase).
150. Carluccio v. 607 Hudson St. Holding Co., Inc., 141 N.J. Eq. 449, 57 A.2d 452
(1948) (public policy alone would give right of rescission).
2. Vest-Pocket Listing
A less well-recognized problem area in broker/seller relation-
ships has been termed "vest-pocket listing."151 This involves yet
another way in which brokers strive to maximize their own re-
turns through restricting the flow of information in the market-
place. To avoid splitting commissions with cooperating brokers, a
listing broker may purposefully withhold a particular listing from
the MLS, believing that the property will sell quickly and easily.
The FTC Report indicates that property so withheld tends to stay
on the market for longer periods of time due to the lack of public
exposure.152 Also, vest-pocket listings appear to command lower
average selling prices.153 Though the survey results admittedly
do not conclusively demonstrate the problem, the time-on-market
and price comparisons strongly suggest that it does in fact occur
and works clearly to the disadvantage of the seller seeking to sell
his property at the highest price in the least amount of time possi-
ble. It is not unlikely that most brokers are unaware of the price
comparisons that only in-depth empirical studies (such as those
conducted for the FTC) point out. However, it should be evident
that in order to fulfill the broker's duty to act in the seller's best
interests, he must use every means available, including the MLS,
to solicit offers on the property.
Vest-pocket listing is another instance in which the use of stan-
dardized listing agreement forms often works to the disadvantage
of the unsuspecting seller. Virtually all standard forms provided
by the listing broker include a provision authorizing the use of
MLS.'54 However, most fail to require the listing to be placed on
an MLS within a specific time period. Unaware of the vest-pocket
listing practice, many sellers unduly subject themselves to the
listing broker's discretion.
151. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at 122-25.
152. The FTC tested for vest pocket listing as follows: Some MLS's are "volun-
tary," leaving it within the broker's discretion whether or not to submit all of their
listings. Others are mandatory. "If brokers who are members of voluntary MLS's
regularly withhold more of their easy-to-sell listings than those brokers who be-
long to mandatory MLS's, the voluntary MLS's would be expected to contain, on
average, properties relatively more difficult to sell." Id. at 122. These voluntarily
listed MLS properties were found to stay on the market about 10% longer than the
properties on a mandatory MLS. Id. at 122-23.
153. One of the ways the FTC tested for this was to compare the mean selling
price of homes sold by the listing broker or one of his agents to the mean selling
price of homes sold by cooperating brokers from firms other than the listing firm.
Throughout different areas, the results consistently demonstrated that homes sold
by cooperating brokers (who obtain listing information from a MLS) sold at a
higher price level than did homes sold by brokers and salesmen with the listing
firm. Id. at 123-24.
154. This authorization is often couched in terms of agreeing to the listing bro-
ker's cooperation with subagents.
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3. Negotiability and Setting the Price
Another problem area which goes to the heart of the bro-
ker/seller relationship deals with the negotiability of brokerage
rates and the valuation of the seller's property. It appears that
the uniformity of commission rates across any geographic area,155
consumer misperceptions of the cause of this uniformity, 5 6 and
the lack of information on alternative arrangements 5 7 deter most
sellers from negotiating broker compensation. 5 8 Furthermore,
the broker is often relied upon to set the asking price for the sub-
ject property.I5 9 The advice and counsel of the broker is widely
recognized as the single most influential factor in determining
this figure.160 In this situation, the broker's duty of loyalty, which
implicitly includes the duty to get the best price possible,161 is in
155. Cases, articles, and studies across the country all indicate that commission
rates are relatively uniform in most local markets. See People v. National Ass'n of
Realtors, 120 Cal. App. 3d 459, 174 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1981) (an antitrust action in
which the court recognized that, despite the discontinuance of setting rates by the
local Board of Realtors, 97% of the properties in the local MLS were still at a flat
commission of 6%); Owen, Kickbacks, Specialization, Price Fixing, and Efficiency
in Residential Real Estate Markets, 29 STAN. L REV. 931, 947-49 (1977); FTC RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 43-56 (an in-depth analysis of the uniformity of commission
rates and the relation to industry interdependence and performance problems).
Sixty-nine percent of all sellers surveyed by NFO agreed with the proposition that
most agents charged the same sale commission. FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at
(NFO Survey) seller question 60.
156. "About half of the sellers questioned said they had no idea how commis-
sion rates are determined. Of the half who did express an opinion, approximately
50% believed that rates are fixed by law or by Boards of Realtors." FTC REPORT,
supra note 1, at 110 (footnote omitted).
157. Most sellers are not even aware of the existence of discount brokers (those
who offer brokerage services at a commission rate below that prevailing in the lo-
cal market). Sixty-four point nine percent of all sellers surveyed by the FTC were
not aware of any "discount agents." FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at (NFO Survey)
seller question 22.
158. Seventy-five point three percent of all sellers surveyed for the FTC made
no attempt to bargain with their agent about the sales commission. Id. at (NFO
Survey) seller question 38.
159. Fifty-four point nine percent of all sellers surveyed for NFO felt that the
broker had provided "a great degree" of service in his ability to recommend a list-
ing price. Another 34.5% believed this service had been provided to "some de-
gree." Id. at (NFO Survey) seller question 21. Thirty point five percent of all
sellers surveyed felt that the single most influential source of information used in
determining their house's listing price was the advice of agents, with another 21%
hinging their decision on "comparables" provided by the agent. Id. at (NFO Sur-
vey) seller question 29.
160. See F. CASE, RESIDENTIAL BROKERAGE: HISTORY, CHARACTERISTICS,
PROBLEMS 2-8, 2-9 (1979).
161. Reexamination, supra note 96, at 1357. Haymes v. Rogers, 70 Ariz. 257, 219
P.2d 339, modified, 70 Ariz. 408, 222 P.2d 789 (1950); Wechsler v. Bowman, 285 N.Y.
direct conflict with his desire to earn a high hourly rate of com-
pensation. The broker is confronted with the choice of making a
quick sale at a reduced price or continuing pursuit of an accepta-
ble buyer at the initial offering price.
Having identified seller ignorance of rate negotiability and the
broker's conflict of interest in setting the listing price, it is inter-
esting to note the resulting absence of stimuli for reform. Con-
fronted with the uniformity of commission rates, despite how out
of line that rate may be in relation to the efforts expended by the
broker, most sellers will feel that they are receiving the same deal
that everyone else who purchases brokerage services receives.162
And as most sellers have no expertise in real estate valuation,
they are typically satisfied with the broker's efforts in setting a
purchase price,163 provided a sale results within a reasonable pe-
riod of time at a price comparable to other recent sales in the
same area.
The question becomes one of deciding whether customer satis-
faction alone can justify the inherent anticompetitiveness of rate
uniformity and the ignoring of possible inaccuracies of biased
party real estate valuation. Absent reform, which, at the very
least, alerts consumers to the realities and conflicts involved, it
appears that these practices will continue and the competitive
weaknesses in the brokerage industry will persist unchanged.
IV. ALTERNATIVES & SOLUTIONS
Assuming that the current state of the law remains unchanged,
how can consumers better ensure the protection of their
interests?
One solution is for the consumer to educate himself. In many
areas of life, consumers are confronted with the problem of decid-
ing whether to cope with their ignorance through the hiring of an
outside party, or take the time and money required to become for-
mally trained in the area. Whether it involves filling out a tax re-
turn, repairing an automobile, or valuing a work of art, the most
practical decision, in light of the years of training that may be re-
quired, is to hire another individual or entity-a specialist-to
perform the service. However, the training required to specialize
284, 34 N.E.2d 322, modified, 285 N.Y. 582, 35 N.E.2d 930 (1941) (duty to get highest
and best price recognized).
162. Most sellers surveyed for the FTC were satisfied overall that the services
they received from their agent were worth the sales commission paid. FTC RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at (NFO Survey) seller question 61.
163. Eighty-four point two percent of all sellers surveyed by NFO felt that their
agent had secured a good price for their house. Id. at (NFO Survey) seller ques-
tion 60.
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in real estate brokerage and to grasp the dynamics of the bro-
ker/buyer/seller relationship is a far less arduous task.
Heightening public awareness of the existing problems should
be zealously pursued by consumer protection forces and local and
state real estate commissions. Simply providing consumers with
the information on the potential problem areas highlighted in this
article in an easy-to-read, condensed pamphlet would allow sell-
ers and buyers to more accurately and confidently evaluate the
performance of their broker.164 Through education, even on a ru-
dimentary level, will come control. And through control, consum-
ers may reduce their risk and better ensure the protection of their
interests.
The more significant and potentially more beneficial solution to
the problem is the development of the "buyer's broker" segment
of the real estate brokerage service market.165 The typical resi-
dential real estate transaction involves the efforts of two brokers,
linked through the MLS.166 The obvious benefits of this market
consolidation and matching function is indisputable. Essential to
the development of a buyer-broker market segment is recognition
within the brokerage industry that sole representation of both the
buyer and the seller would benefit all parties to the transaction.
As indicated, the belief that a broker can act in a dual agency
capacity and effectively represent both the buyer and seller is er-
roneous. Even though parties are often satisfied with their bro-
ker's performance,167 whether their interests were actually
perfected is difficult to assess.
Effective representation of both buyers and sellers need not in-
volve an immediate and total transformation of current contrac-
tual and service compensation practices. Buyer-broker services
could simply register prospective purchasers who seek brokerage
services through an agreement to cooperate with the broker upon
his finding an acceptable property for purchase. The only caveat
is that as the use of buyer-brokers becomes a more established
industry practice, the natural tendency may be toward the same
contractual standardization with which sellers are currently con-
164. The California Department of Real Estate has no such pamphlet available
for the general public.
165. A "buyer-broker" would be hired exclusively by the prospective home pur-
chaser and would act solely as the buyer's agent.
166. See supra notes 59 and 65.
167. See supra note 162.
fronted.168 Furthermore, there is nothing in the law of agency
that would prevent the buyer-broker from accepting compensa-
tion for his services through a disclosed commission split similar
to the current practice between the listing and cooperating
broker.169
Eventually, when independent representation of both parties
through their own brokers becomes a more well-recognized prac-
tice, more flexibility can be built into the area of compensation.
Each party should be allowed to directly pay for the services of
their respective broker, whether the figure is set as a percentage
of the final purchase price or a flat rate. Such a practice would
ensure that both brokers receive the negotiated commission 170
which is most in line with their abilities in a competitive market-
place. This practice would also diffuse any motivation on the part
of the buyer's representative to steer away from the listings
which provide a less than "adequate" commission split.171 Once
established, independent representation of the buyer and seller
will naturally lead to a more competitive, ethical and efficient bro-
kerage industry.
V. CONCLUSION
The time has come for reassessment of the viability of sub-
agency and dual agency principles as they relate to the residen-
tial real estate transaction. Though consumer education and
industry self-correction would be ideal, it is likely that adequate
representation of the interests of both buyers and sellers will be
achieved only through legislative and/or judicial intervention.
The FTC Staff Report and its National Family Opinion Survey ap-
pear to provide ample background information from which such
intervention may proceed.
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168. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
169. The listing broker and any cooperating broker involved commonly split the
commission fee which the seller agreed in the listing contract to pay upon sale.
See FTC REPORT, supra note 1, at (NFO Survey) MLS question 10.
170. See supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
171. Some cooperating brokers are inclined toward "steering" buyers away
from the listings of discount brokers that provide a commission split lower than
that prevalent in their geographic area. See FTC REPORT, supra note, 1, at 38-41
and 154.
